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Hatch-Waxman – Thoughtful Planning or Just 
Piling On: A Consideration of the Federal Trade 
Commission’s Proposed Changes* 
Brian Urevig 
INTRODUCTION 
The regulatory environment governing the pharmaceutical 
development process attempts to achieve two seemingly 
opposing goals – promoting new drug innovation and 
expediting the entry of generic versions of the same drugs into 
the market.  The most recent attempt to achieve these goals is 
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act 
of 1984, more commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.1  
Although unquestionably successful in achieving these goals,2 
the Hatch-Waxman Act may also have created incentives for 
anticompetitive activity within the pharmaceutical industry.3  
Brand-name manufacturers have arguably found ways to 
subvert the law’s intent.4  For example, brand-name 
manufacturers have been accused of filing patent extensions for 
inconsequential changes to existing pharmaceuticals shortly 
before the original patent expires in order to stave off generic 

* This note is published online at http://mipr.umn.edu. 
 1. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.). 
 2. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the Hatch-Waxman 
Act results in consumer savings of $8 to $10 billion annually.  Competition in 
the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Antitrust Implications of Patent Settlements: 
Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 17 (2001) 
(statement of Molly Boast, Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade 
Commission) [hereinafter Boast, Statement of the FTC].  This has been caused 
by the creation of an environment that encourages both new drug development 
and the use of generic equivalents.  See id. 
 3. See id. at 17-18. 
 4. See id. (noting that “the commission has observed conduct suggesting 
that some firms may be exploiting the statutory and regulatory scheme be 
reaching agreements to delay the introduction of generic drugs to the 
market”). 
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competition.5  In addition, recent litigation has indicated that 
pharmaceutical companies (both generic and brand-name 
manufacturers) that were, theoretically, competitors, may have 
been forming collusive arrangements with one other.6  This has 
resulted in the accusation that generic equivalents are being 
unlawfully squeezed out of the marketplace (or never allowed 
to enter) through violations of the antitrust laws.7  Brand-name 
manufacturers, however, have countered that they are not 
abusing the Hatch-Waxman Act, but rather are being abused 
by it.8  They argue that some of the provisions of the Hatch-
Waxman Act have created perverse incentives for generic 
manufacturers to initiate frivolous lawsuits designed only to 
result in large settlement payments to the generic 
manufacturer.9  Furthermore, brand-name manufacturers 
contend that the effective length of patent protection is 
insufficient to allow them to recover the enormous costs 
required to develop, test, and market a new pharmaceutical.10  
Due to the complexity and importance of this situation, in 2001 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) initiated a study 
designed to provide information to Congress to use in 
consideration of possible reform to the Hatch-Waxman Act.11  In 

 5. Cf. Editorial, Right Track on Generic Drugs, THE HARTFORD 
COURANT, Oct. 23, 2002, at A22, available at LEXIS, News Group File, All 
(citing President Bush’s announcement that the FDA “would propose rules to 
stop drug manufacturers from filing multiple patent-infringement lawsuits, 
which can block generic medicines for years”). 
 6. See Boast, Statement of the FTC, supra note 2, at 20. 
 7. See James T. O’Reilly, Prescription Pricing & Monopoly Extension: 
Elderly Drug Users Lose the Shell Game of Post-Patent Exclusivity, 29 N. KY. 
L. REV. 413 (2002).  O’Reilly first notes that “the [brand-name patent holder] 
can pay the first generic firm to keep its drug away from the market, and 
block other generic competitors for at least six months.”  Id. at 414.  But, as 
O’Reilly observes, “[the FTC] has challenged both the monopolist’s practice 
and the generic’s sellout of consumers.”  Id. 
 8. Waxman-Hatch Has Boosted Generics, but Jury still out on Effects on 
Innovators, PHARMA MARKETLETTER, Jan. 6, 2003. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See Joseph P. Reid, Note, A Generic Drug Price Scandal: Too Bitter a 
Pill for the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act to 
Swallow?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 309, 332-33 (1999).  Reid discusses the 
limitations contained within the Hatch-Waxman Act patent term extension 
provisions and asserts that “while congress designed the extension provisions 
to protect the pioneer industry’s returns on its original investments, which 
even before the Act’s passage often did not cover research and development 
costs, the [Congressional Budget Office] admits that protection from the 
extensions has been less than complete, meaning that pioneer companies 
operate on an even thinner margin than before.”  Id. at 333. 
 11. See Boast, Statement of the FTC, supra note 2, at 18. 
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July 2002, the FTC completed the study and issued its report 
containing proposed changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act.12 
The purpose of this Note is to review the FTC’s proposed 
changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act.  This Note will first 
describe the regulatory and economic environment in which 
pharmaceutical companies currently operate.  Next, a summary 
of recent litigation will provide an understanding of current 
controversial pharmaceutical industry practices.  The new 
proposals by the FTC will be discussed thereafter, followed by a 
discussion of their potential effect on the pharmaceutical 
industry.  This Note concludes that the proposed FTC changes 
may aid in preventing some of the collusion between 
pharmaceutical companies.  However, this Note also concludes 
that there are several deficiencies in the proposals that should 
be addressed to more fully alleviate the problems in the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The price of pharmaceuticals has been under intense 
scrutiny during the past decade.13  The significance of 
pharmaceutical prices can be demonstrated by a review of the 
financial information involved.  During 2000, total spending on 
pharmaceuticals rose 18.8% to 131.9 billion.14  In 2001, 
spending increased again, this time by 17%.15  Furthermore, 
pharmaceutical spending is predicted to reach approximately 
$4 trillion over the next decade.16  During 2001, brand-name 
pharmaceuticals sold for an average of $72 per prescription, 

 12. See FTC GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN 
FTC STUDY, at ii (July 2002) [hereinafter GENERIC DRUG ENTRY STUDY].  
During the past summer, the Senate passed the McCain-Schumer bill.  See 
Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act, S. 812, 107th Cong. (2001).  
This bill provides more drastic recommendations than the recent GENERIC 
DRUG ENTRY STUDY.  See Julia Rosenthal, Hatch-Waxman Use or Abuse? 
Collusive Settlements between Brand-Name and Generic Drug Manufacturers, 
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 317, 328-29 (2002).  However, this bill has not been 
passed by the House of Representatives, and is not expected to do so.  Cf. id. at 
329 n.104.  In addition, President George W. Bush recently proposed changes 
to the Hatch-Waxman Act that are very similar to the recommendations in the 
FTC report.  See Scott Gottlieb, Patent Mistakes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2002, at 
A18 and compare with GENERIC DRUG ENTRY STUDY, at ii. 
 13. Boast, Statement of the FTC, supra note 2, at 17. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Holly Rosenkrantz, Bush Proposes Rules to Shrink Prescription 
Drug Costs, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Oct. 21, 2002. 
 16. See id. 
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compared with $17 for their generic equivalent.17  Furthermore, 
over the next five years, patents are set to expire on brand-
name drugs that currently have sales of $20 billion.18  The 
implications of either extending some of these patents or 
having generic equivalents take their place will clearly affect 
the financial health of both consumers and pharmaceutical 
manufacturers.19 
However, the situation is not as simple as replacing brand-
name pharmaceuticals with generic drugs in an effort to reduce 
costs to the lowest amount possible.  There is a delicate balance 
to maintain.  Brand-name manufacturers must continue to be 
given incentives to bring new and improved pharmaceuticals 
into the marketplace and to be compensated for doing so.20  
New pharmaceuticals may be increasingly expensive, but they 
may also minimize the need for or prevent even more expensive 

 17. See Editorial, supra note 5. 
 18. See Boast, Statement of the FTC, supra note 2, at 18.  The potential 
impact of this can be demonstrated by the fact that when a generic medication 
first competes with a brand-name pharmaceutical, the price for the brand-
name medication drops by 25%.  Id. at 14.  Furthermore, when additional 
generic brands enter the market, the price can drop to 50% of its original 
price.  Id. at 14, 18. 
 19. For an example of the impact of patent protection over a 
pharmaceutical, as well as the extent to which brand-name manufacturers 
rely on their successful products, consider the situation of Schering-Plough 
and its allergy drug “Claritin.”  At one time, sales of Claritin accounted for $3 
billion of Schering’s $9 billion in total annual revenue.  See Matthew Herper, 
Schering-Plough’s Earnings Limbo, (January 10, 2003) at 
http://www.forbes.com/2003/01/10/cx_mh_0110sgp.html (last visited Mar. 01, 
2003).  However, the medication can now be sold without a prescription and is  
subject to intense generic competition.  See id. (citing competition from Wyeth, 
Inc.’s sales of loratadine, the active ingredient in Claritin).  Because Claritin is 
now sold without a prescription, Schering-Plough decreased the price from 
over $3 to just $1 per tablet.  Id.  Currently, the generic manufacturer has 
been marketing its equivalent at less then seventy cents per tablet.  Id.  The 
end result of all of this is that sales of Claritin are now expected to bring 
Schering-Plough only $400 million per year.  Id.  Predictably, this has resulted 
in significantly lower sales and earnings estimates, along with a plummeting 
stock price.  Id.  Clearly consumers will benefit through lower prices on 
Claritin.  However, the Claritin saga also demonstrates how dependant brand-
name manufacturers can be on just a few successful products for a significant 
amount of their sales.  When one of these products loses patent protection, the 
implications are clear.  The loss of protection indicates the importance of 
innovation to brand-name manufacturers: innovation allows them to have a 
continuous pipeline of patent protected pharmaceuticals that can replace those 
drugs that lose patent protection. 
 20. A lack of innovation has obvious implications – prices will be reduced 
in the short-term, but in twenty years, we will have substantially the same 
medications in our arsenal as we have today. 
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surgical procedures and extended hospitalization.21  
Furthermore, in order to develop an approved brand-name 
drug, a pharmaceutical company can spend anywhere from 
$200 – 500 million.22  Even after a manufacturer receives Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) approval for a brand-name 
medication there is no certainty of profit.  Less than one in 
three drugs approved by the FDA will eventually return a 
profit.23  Furthermore, risks of drug-design-defect litigation as 
well as competition from both generic and other brand-name 
drug manufacturers result in a highly competitive market for 
new pharmaceuticals.24  Finally, the United States 
pharmaceutical industry is also an important source of 
innovation for the world.  Unites States pharmaceutical 
companies “developed almost half of the new [pharmaceutical] 
products released worldwide between 1970 and 1992.”25 
A. REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
1. Food and Drug Regulation 
The current FDA regulations26 require that a 

 21. See Examining Issues Related to Competition in the Pharmaceutical 
Marketplace: A Review of the FTC Report, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent 
Expiration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on 
Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 36 (2002) (statement of Timothy J. Muris, 
Chairman, Federal Trade Commission). 
 22. Mandy Wilson, Note, Pharmaceutical Patent Protection: More Generic 
Favored Legislation May Cause Pioneer Drug Companies to Pull the Plug on 
Innovation, 90 KY. L.J. 495, 497 (2002); see also ROY LEVY, FTC, THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: A DISCUSSION OF COMPETITIVE AND ANTITRUST 
ISSUES IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF CHANGE 175-77 (Mar. 1999), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/pharmaceutical/drugrep.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 
2003).  Levy notes that the nominal cost to produce a “new chemical entity” 
went from $135.15 million in 1985 to $423.05 million in 1995, with a high of 
$504.61 million in 1994.  Id. at 177, Table A.4. 
 23. See Wilson, supra note 22, at 499.  Furthermore, prior to clinical 
testing, pharmaceutical companies typically screen some 5,000 to 10,000 
compounds with only five of these usually reaching the clinical testing phase.  
LEVY, supra note 22, at 178.  Of these five, only one typically received FDA 
approval.  Id. 
 24. Wilson, supra note 22, at 499-500. 
 25. Reid, supra note 10, at 330. 
 26. The authority of the FDA derives from the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), ch. 675, § 701(a) 52 Stat. 1040, 1055 (1938) (codified at 
21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2000)) which states that the secretary can “promulgate 
regulations for the efficient enforcement of this Act.”  See Thomas W. Merrill 
& Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: the Original 
Convention 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 514 (2002). 
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pharmaceutical manufacturer complete extensive safety and 
efficacy testing prior to submission to the FDA for review and 
approval.27  Recent estimates indicate that the process of 
preparing a new drug for review and then receiving FDA 
approval takes approximately eight and one half years.28  At the 
outset of the process, even before any human clinical trials may 
begin, the pioneer firm must generate data on the drug’s 
chemical structure, safety, efficacy, and toxicology both in vitro 
and in animals.29  Once human studies begin, they are broken 
down into three phases.30  Phase I trials are mainly designed to 
generate data from a small test population (generally less than 
100 subjects) regarding potential side effects as well as 
metabolism and pharmacologic data.31  Phase II trials are 
conducted on a larger population (generally several hundred) 
and are designed mainly to test the effectiveness of the drug.32  
Finally, Phase III trials are conducted involving a much larger 
test population (generally thousands of subjects) than either of 
the previous phases.33  This phase is intended to reconfirm 
previous efficacy and effectiveness data as well as obtain data 
on the pharmaceutical’s adverse event profile over a longer 
time frame.34  Upon completion of these three phases, a New 
Drug Application (NDA) is filed with the FDA.  The NDA 
includes detailed information obtained from all three phases.35  
The FDA then begins its process of review and approval.  The 
approval time after submission is currently two and a half 
years.36 
Currently, the FDA is asking some drug companies to 

 27. Prior to the FFDCA, there were no regulations covering the 
development of pharmaceutical products.  The initial FDA Act covered only 
safety requirements.  This changed in 1962, when the FDA began to require 
efficacy information as well.  See Reid, supra note 10, at 313. 
 28. LEVY, supra note 22, at 182. 
 29. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(8) (2002). 
 30. See id. § 312.21. 
 31. Id. § 312.21(a). 
 32. Id. § 312.21(b). 
 33. Id. § 312.21(c). 
 34. Id.  Phase I trials generally last one year, Phase II trials last two 
years and Phase III trials last three years.  LEVY, supra note 22, at 183. 
 35. See 21 U.S.C. §355(a), (b) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2002). 
 36. LEVY, supra note 22, at 183.  Note that aforementioned time frames do 
not include the pre-clinical stages of pharmaceutical development.  When this 
is considered, the total time from initial compound synthesis to FDA approval 
increases to almost 15 years.  See LEVY, supra note 22, at 183. 
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double the size of Phase III trials.37  This is true despite the fact 
that drug companies already test drugs on an average of 5,000 
patients, compared to only 1,500 in the 1970s.38 
2. Hatch – Waxman Act 
Prior to the early 1980’s, there were few generic 
competitors for brand-name pharmaceuticals.39  Largely in 
response to the public’s perception that health care costs were 
spiraling out of control, the Hatch-Waxman Act was passed, 
amending the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.40  This 
was viewed as a compromise between brand-name 
manufacturers and generic manufacturers.41  Essentially, 
generic manufacturers benefited from changes that expedited 
the process of obtaining FDA approval for generic 
pharmaceuticals and brand-name manufacturers obtained 
provisions that increased the effective length of their patents.42 
Since its passing, the Hatch-Waxman Act has been hailed 
as the “most important consumer bill of the decade.”43  The 
Hatch-Waxman Act attempted to reshape the statutory 

 37. Gottlieb, supra note 12. 
 38. Id. 
 39. When this legislation was passed in 1984, eight percent of the 
pharmaceutical market consisted of generic drugs.  See Melissa K. Davis, 
Monopolistic Tendencies of Brand name Drug Companies in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 15 J.L. & COM. 357, 365 (1995).  Prior to the Hatch-
Waxman Act, prescribing generics tended to be an afterthought for physicians.  
This largely resulted from physicians facing little pressure to prescribe a 
lower-cost alternative because, prior to managed care’s dominance in the 
health care industry, physicians were rarely associated with managed care 
organizations and were free to prescribe more costly brand-name 
pharmaceuticals.  In addition, insurance companies rarely reimbursed 
patients for prescriptions and thus paid little attention to the cost of 
pharmaceuticals.  Furthermore, antisubstitution laws often prevented 
physicians from asking patients if they preferred to use a generic medication 
in lieu of a more costly brand-name pharmaceutical.  See Jaclyn L. Miller, 
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act: The Elimination of 
Competition Between Drug Manufacturers, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 91, 
92-93 (2002). 
 40. See Reid, supra note 10, at 313.  Brand-name manufacturers were 
concerned that the time required to comply with the increasingly lengthy FDA 
approval requirements left insufficient time to recoup development costs.  This 
resulted in a belief that there would soon be little hope for profits to fund 
future research.  See id. 
 41. See Davis, supra note 39, at 363. 
 42. See id. 
 43. David A. Balto, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Antitrust 
Risks, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 321, 324 (2000) (citing Senator Orrin Hatch’s 
comments). 
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landscape of patent laws and FDA regulation over the 
pharmaceutical development and approval process.44  The 
objectives of the Hatch-Waxman Act were twofold: 1) make 
lower-priced generic versions of brand-name pharmaceuticals 
more widely available;45 and 2) provide adequate incentives for 
pharmaceutical companies to invest in the development of new 
drugs.46 
To accomplish these broad objectives, the Hatch-Waxman 
Act included five key provisions: (1) Generic drug 
manufacturers were allowed to use brand-name drugs that 
were still protected by patents solely to gather data to obtain 
FDA approval for the generic drug.47  2) An Abbreviated New 
Drug Application (“ANDA”) was created for generic drugs to 
streamline the FDA approval process for generics.48  This 
allows a generic manufacturer to use the safety and efficacy 
data previously gathered by the applicable brand-name drug 
company.49  3) A 180–day market exclusivity period was created 

 44. See id. 
 45. See Reid, supra note 10, at 320.  In 1984, the FDA estimated that 
there were 150 brand-name drugs whose patents had expired for which there 
was no generic equivalent.  See GENERIC DRUG ENTRY STUDY, supra note 12, 
at 4.  There were three key difficulties that generic manufacturers faced in the 
pre-Hatch-Waxman-Act environment.  First, they were required to perform 
their own safety and efficacy studies (which were very costly and time-
consuming, a fact with which brand-name manufacturers were all too 
familiar).  Second, there was no streamlined procedure to approve generic 
versions of pharmaceuticals whose patents had expired.  Finally, the generic 
company could not begin the FDA approval process until after the relevant 
brand-name patent had expired.  See id. at 3-4. 
 46. See GENERIC DRUG ENTRY STUDY, supra note 12, at 4.  Brand-name 
pharmaceutical companies usually obtain patents prior to FDA approval of the 
drug.  The effective term of the patent is then shortened by the time required 
for the FDA to ensure safety and efficacy.  In essence, the patent on a 
pharmaceutical begins to run before the manufacturer can begin to market 
and sell the product.  This results in a shorter effective patent term when 
compared to other industries.  See id. 
 47. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000) (“It shall not be an act of infringement 
to . . . use . . . a patented invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the 
development and submission of information under a Federal law which 
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs. . . .”).  Thus, generic 
manufacturers may immediately begin using the brand-name drug they were 
trying to copy rather than having to wait until the brand-name patent expires.  
The generic manufacturer may thus have a generic equivalent ready to 
market as soon as the brand-name patent expired. 
 48. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j). 
 49. See GENERIC DRUG ENTRY STUDY, supra note 12, at 5. This expedited 
the generic approval process and allowed generic manufacturers to forgo 
expensive clinical trials.  Id.  As codified, the generic manufacturer must 
demonstrate that the generic product has the same active ingredient(s), route 
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for the first generic manufacturer to file an ANDA for a specific 
drug.50  This allows that generic manufacturer to market their 
drug without any other generic competition for 180 days.51  4) 
The brand-name drug manufacturer was granted the possibility 
of additional patent protection for time lost during the lengthy 
process of drug approval by the FDA.52  5) Finally, generic 
manufacturers, upon filing an ANDA, were required to file one 
of four possible certifications regarding the status of the related 
brand-name patent.53  The four possible certifications by the 
generic manufacturer are as follows: 1) that the brand-name 
patent was never filed;54  2) that the brand-name patent has 
expired;55  3) that the brand-name patent has not yet expired, 
but will do so on a particular date;56  or 4) that the brand-name 
patent is either invalid or will not be infringed by the proposed 
generic version (also known as a “Paragraph IV 
Certification”).57  If the generic manufacturer files a Paragraph 
IV Certification, the brand-name manufacturer then has forty-
five days in which to bring a patent infringement suit against 
the generic ANDA applicant.58  When such a suit is filed, the 

of administration, dosage form, and strength as the brand-name drug.  See 21 
U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii) & (iii).  Additionally, the generic must demonstrate 
“bioequivalence,” which means that the rate and extent of absorption of the 
generic drug is not significantly different from that of the brand-name drug.  
See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv). 
 50. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
 51. Id.  The first generic manufacturer is essentially granted a “mini-
monopoly” from any generic competitors.  Although the generic manufacturer 
will have to compete against the brand-name drug, because the cost of 
producing a generic is significantly lower, the generic manufacturer is highly 
likely to be able to undercut the brand-name price, while still making a large 
profit margin on the generic. 
 52. See 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(4) & (c) (2000).  This patent term extension, 
however, has not been as forthcoming as brand-name pharmaceutical 
manufacturers had hoped.  For example, of the ninety applications for the 
extension of a pharmaceutical patent during 1998, only two were granted the 
full period of extension.  See Miller, supra note 39, at 100. 
 53. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2000). 
 54. See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I). 
 55. See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(II).  If the generic manufacturer certifies 
under either of the first two certification options, the FDA may approve the 
ANDA immediately.  See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(i). 
 56. See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III).  If this certification is filed, the FDA may 
approve the ANDA to be effective on the date the brand-name patent is 
certified to expire.  See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(ii). 
 57. See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).  This certification is the source of much 
related litigation.  See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 58. See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).  If the brand-name manufacturer does not 
file such a lawsuit, the ANDA will be immediately approved after forty-five 
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FDA cannot approve the generic ANDA for thirty months.59  
This automatic stay may be supplemented by additional thirty-
month stays.60 
The Hatch-Waxman Act appears to have been successful in 
accomplishing at least some of its original objectives.  
Consumer access to lower-priced generic drugs has increased 
and the United States continues to be the world leader in 
pharmaceutical innovation and development.61  For example, 
generic prescriptions now comprise over 47% of prescriptions.62  
This compares to only 19% in 1984 when the Hatch-Waxman 
Act was introduced.63  Moreover, prior to the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, approximately 35% of pharmaceuticals no longer under 
patent protection had generic counterparts.64  Today, virtually 
all do.65  Although increased access to equivalent generic 
medications at a lower cost has been an unquestionable benefit 
to consumers, the Hatch-Waxman Act may also have a dark 
side.  The very rules that purported to increase competition 
have perhaps not only increased incentives for brand-name and 
generic manufacturers to engage in collusive behavior, but may 
have also encouraged generic manufacturers to file frivolous 
lawsuits.66  In addition, as reported by the Congressional 
Budget Office, the Hatch-Waxman Act may also have tilted the 

days.  See id. 
 59. See id.  If a court finds the brand-name patent invalid or not infringed 
by the generic drug, the FDA’s approval of the ANDA will become effective on 
the date of such ruling.  See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I).  Furthermore, if the patent 
term was scheduled to expire prior to the end of the thirty-month extension, 
the ANDA would still be approved when the patent term was scheduled to 
end.  See GENERIC DRUG ENTRY STUDY, supra note 12, at ii. Thus, while the 
thirty-month extension does prevent generic entry into the market, it does not 
increase the length of the patent term.  It simply prevents the generic 
manufacturer from marketing a competing product while the infringement 
litigation occurs. 
 60. See GENERIC DRUG ENTRY STUDY, supra note 12, at iii.  After the 
generic manufacturer files the ANDA, it is possible for the brand-name 
manufacturer to file an additional patent over the drug at issue.  This forces 
the generic manufacturer to re-certify the ANDA, which gives the brand-name 
manufacturer another opportunity to file a suit and begin a new thirty-month 
stay.  See id. 
 61. See Balto, supra note 43, at 324. 
 62. See GENERIC DRUG ENTRY STUDY, supra note 12, at i. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See CBO, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS 
AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 37 (July 
1998) [hereinafter CBO DRUG STUDY]. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See discussion infra Part III. 
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balance too far in favor of generic manufacturers at the expense 
of brand-name manufacturers.67 
3. Antitrust Laws 
A market economy operates on the assumption that 
competitive markets will invariably result in the most efficient 
allocation of resources, the largest variety of consumer choices, 
and the lowest prices possible.68  Antitrust laws, which seek to 
encourage and preserve the competitive marketplace, target 
private conduct that disrupts market efficiency.69  There are 
three main statutory antitrust provisions that define unlawful 
conduct: 1) Section 1 of the Sherman Act; 2) Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act; and 3) Section 7 of the Clayton Act.70 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that “every contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.”71  In order 
to establish a violation of Section 1, a “contract, 
combination . . . or conspiracy” must be established.72  Thus, 
bilateral conduct involving two or more entities is required.  In 
the context of the Hatch-Waxman Act, this conduct might 
entail a generic manufacturer agreeing with a brand-name 
manufacturer that the generic manufacturer will not enter the 
market with a generic copy in return for payments from the 
brand-name manufacturer. 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act states that, “Every person 
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or 
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any 
part of the trade or commerce among the several States . . . 
shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”73  Unlike Section 1, 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act can be applied to conduct by a 
single firm (monopolization) as well as conduct by two or more 
firms (combination or conspiracy).74 

 67. See CBO DRUG STUDY, supra note 64, at ix. 
 68. See David A. Balto, Intellectual Property: General Antitrust Principles, 
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST 2002, at 11 (Practising Law Institute 
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course, Handbook 
Series No. G0-0119, June - July 2002). 
 69. See id. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
 72. 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
 73. Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
 74. See Balto, supra note 68, at 12. 
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Section 7 of the Clayton Act proscribes stock and asset 
acquisitions that, “in any line of commerce or in any activity 
affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of 
such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or 
to tend to create a monopoly.”75  Under this section, stock or 
asset mergers or acquisitions of one pharmaceutical company 
by another may be subject to scrutiny depending on the effect 
on the relevant product and geographic market. 
These three antitrust statutes combine to create risks in 
the Hatch-Waxman-Act environment for violations by both 
brand-name and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers.  One 
of the antitrust problems in the pharmaceutical industry 
results from exit payments by brand-name manufacturers to a 
potential generic competitor that either exits or never enters 
the relevant market.76  This payment is a “horizontal market–
division agreement” that antitrust laws find per se illegal.77  
Consumers end up paying more and buying less while the 
conspirators share in monopoly profits.78  Another potential 
antitrust problem arises when a brand-name manufacturer and 
a generic manufacturer conspire to have the generic 
manufacturer withdraw a patent challenge in return for cash 
payments.  This collusion fails to trigger the 180-day 
exclusivity for the first generic to file the ANDA and delays 
generic entry into the market indefinitely.79 

 75. 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
 76. See Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent 
Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L. 
REV. 747, 748 (2002). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. 
 79. Essentially what occurs is as follows.  The generic manufacturer files 
an ANDA with a Paragraph IV Certification as discussed supra Part I.A.2.  
The brand-name manufacturer then files an infringement lawsuit within 
forty-five days, which begins the automatic thirty-month stay.  In addition, the 
filing of the ANDA by the generic manufacturer creates a 180-day period of 
market exclusivity for the generic manufacturer as specified in 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I) (2000).  The key point is that the 180-day period does not 
begin until “the first commercial marketing of the drug” that was produced by 
the first generic manufacturer to file the ANDA.  See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I).  
Therefore, if the first generic manufacturer withdraws its Paragraph IV 
patent challenge, it is essentially agreeing to not market the product.  By not 
ever marketing the product, the start of the 180-day period is never triggered 
and all other generic competitors are prevented from having a competing 
ANDA approved by the FDA.  Without an approved ANDA, no generic 
competitors can market their product to compete with the brand-name drug.  
The result is that the patent term extends beyond the statutory allowed period 
and results in the brand-name manufacturer earning higher returns than a 
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4. Patent Laws 
Patents are essentially legal monopolies that society 
tolerates in the belief that innovation would not otherwise 
occur in a free market.80  The pharmaceutical industry presents 
a classic example of a free market failure.  Without patent 
protection, anyone could copy a drug as soon as it was 
marketed.  This realization is important because, unlike the 
cost of producing an automobile, for example, the ingredient 
and manufacturing cost of producing a pharmaceutical is 
generally quite small.81  The majority of the costs of producing a 
pharmaceutical are incurred during the development, testing, 
and approval of the compound that will later be manufactured 
and sold.82  If a generic manufacturer could simply copy the 
formulation immediately after it was developed or marketed, 
they could manufacture it and sell it for a significantly lower 
price than the brand-name manufacturer.  The brand-name 
manufacturer, of course, would need to recover the costs of 
developing and testing the drug.  Obviously, they would be 
unable to recover their costs and produce any profit, resulting 
in less incentive to develop new pharmaceuticals.  Ultimately, 
innovation and the consumer would suffer.  In the case of 
pharmaceuticals, although there may be altruistic motives, 
profit is the principal lure enticing drug manufacturers to 
invest large sums of time and money toward the discovery of 
new drugs.83  Patent law offers the protection allowing this 
investment to occur. 
All patent laws are enacted pursuant to Article I, Section 8, 
of the Constitution, which provides, “The Congress shall have 
the Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 

competitive market would allow. 
 80. Society tolerates a firm having monopoly power due to the belief that, 
unless the firm is able to earn monopoly profits for some period of time, less 
innovation will occur.  See Crane, supra note 76, at 754. 
 81. See Robert H. Balance, Market and Industrial Structure, in 
CONTESTED GROUND: PUBLIC PURPOSE AND PRIVATE INTEREST IN THE 
REGULATION OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 97 (Peter Davis ed., 1996) (Showing 
that the manufacturing [i.e. labor and material] costs for pharmaceuticals for 
brand-name manufacturers were approximately 25% of total costs during 
1989). 
 82. See LEVY, supra note 22, at 175-78. 
 83. See F.M. SCHERER, The Pharmaceutical Industry, in HANDBOOK OF 
HEALTH ECONOMICS 1317 (A.J. Culyer & J.P. Newhouse eds., vol. 1B 2000). 
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Discoveries.”84  Under this authority, Congress has enacted 
laws allowing the owner of a patent to exclude others from 
infringing that patent by making, using, or selling the patented 
invention.85  The grant of a patent is intended to increase the 
perceived reward to inventors.86  The philosophy is that the 
greater the potential reward, the more firms will be willing to 
invest in new technologies and innovation.87  This goal is 
accomplished by granting the patent for a limited period of 
time.  After the patent expires, the previously protected 
information is publicly available for all to use. 
The patent term for all products is currently twenty years 
from the filing of the patent application.88  Prior to the 
twentieth century, pharmaceutical manufacturers (like any 
other manufacturer) were able to use the entire patent term to 
market their product.89  However, with the advent of the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) in 1938, 
pharmaceutical manufacturers were effectively prevented from 
utilizing the full length of the patent term for product 
marketing.90  The FDCA required pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to spend time proving a drug is safe and 
effective prior to marketing the drug – time that is effectively 
taken away from the patent term during which they can 
recover their costs.91  This process has been estimated to leave 
only ten years for pharmaceutical manufacturers to recoup 
their costs.92 
B. ANTITRUST RISKS 
There are three main risks that the Hatch-Waxman Act 
appears to have created for anticompetitive behavior.  First, as 
previously noted, FDA approval of an ANDA filed by a generic 
manufacturer cannot occur during the automatic thirty-month 
stay of approval.93  This delay provides a significant enticement 
for litigation that may have little relationship to the underlying 

 84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 85. These statutes have been codified in 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-351 (2000). 
 86. See Crane, supra note 76, at 754. 
 87. See id. 
 88. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(2) (2000). 
 89. See Miller, supra note 39, at 95. 
 90. See id. at 95-6. 
 91. See id. at 96. 
 92. See id. at 98. 
 93. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2000). 
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brand-name patent.94  Essentially, the brand-name 
manufacturer is granted a preliminary injunction without any 
judicial review.95  By filing litigation solely to protect its 
monopoly position, the brand-name manufacturer runs the risk 
entering into an illegal restraint of trade. 
Second, the 180-day exclusivity period for the first generic 
challenger does not have any requirement that it ever be 
triggered.96  Thus, if the infringement litigation is ongoing—or 
if the generic manufacturer has yet to launch its product—the 
generic market is essentially closed to other generic 
competitors.97  The brand-name drug continues to have patent 
protection, regardless of its actual validity.98  This fact is a 
significant enticement for a brand-name manufacturer and a 
generic manufacturer to enter into a collusive agreement.99 
Third, because multiple thirty-month stays of approval are 
allowed,100 there is an incentive for brand-name manufacturers 
to file either patent extensions or additional patents over 
pharmaceuticals when their original patent term is about to 
end. 
C. RECENT ANTITRUST LITIGATION 
The FTC’s recent activity has challenged alleged 
anticompetitive agreements between pioneer and generic 
manufacturers.  These actions address agreements reached in 
the context of the Hatch-Waxman Act.  The FTC has been 
concerned that some firms may be exploiting the regulatory 
scheme by forming agreements to delay or prevent the 
introduction of generic drugs into the pharmaceutical market.  
Actions have been initiated against Schering-Plough, Hoechst 
Marion Roussell, and Abbott–Geneva in the past several years. 

 94. See Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 327. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 97. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 98. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 99. See Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 327-28.  For example, the generic 
manufacturer could agree to never launch its product, effectively excluding 
other generics from entering the market.  This practice is exactly what Barr 
Laboratories has often been accused of.  See infra note 159 and accompanying 
text. 
 100. See GENERIC DRUG ENTRY STUDY, supra note 12, at iii. 
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1. Schering-Plough 
The first action entails two agreements involving Schering-
Plough.101  Both agreements regard generic versions of a 
Schering-Plough medication called K-Dur 20.102 
In the first agreement, Upsher-Smith filed an ANDA with 
a Paragraph IV Certification for its generic version of K-Dur 
20.103  Within forty-five days, Schering-Plough filed suit against 
Upsher-Smith for patent infringement.104  However, 
immediately prior to the trial, the two companies settled and 
Schering-Plough agreed to pay $60 million to Upsher-Smith.105  
In return, Upsher-Smith agreed not to enter the market with 
any version of K-Dur 20 prior to September 2001.106 
The second agreement involved ESI Lederle.107  ESI 
planned on releasing its generic version of K-Dur 20 after 
Upsher-Smith’s 180-day exclusivity period ended.108  However, 
since Upsher-Smith had yet to introduce its generic version of 
K-Dur 20 into the market, the 180-day period had not begun.109  
Furthermore, since Upsher-Smith agreed not to market the 
generic until September 2001, it would be almost six years 
until ESI would be able to market its generic product.110  
Schering-Plough then filed suit against ESI to trigger the 
thirty-month stay.111  ESI then entered into an agreement with 
Schering-Plough for a payment of at least $20 million.112 

 101. See Complaint at ¶¶ 1, 38, & 51, In re Schering-Plough Corp., FTC 
Docket No. 9297 (Mar. 30, 2001) [hereinafter Schering-Plough Complaint], 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/04/scheringpart3cmp.pdf. 
 102. See id. at ¶ 1. 
 103. See id. at ¶ 38. 
 104. See id. at ¶ 39. 
 105. See id. at ¶ 44. 
 106. See id.  Schering-Plough also received licenses for five of Upsher’s 
products.  See id.  However, none of the licenses were ever used in any 
meaningful way.  See id. at ¶ 46.  This gave the impression that the licenses 
were simply included in an attempt to hide the true nature of the agreement. 
See id. at ¶¶ 45-46. 
 107. See id. at ¶ 51.  ESI Lederle, Inc. is a division of American Home 
Products.  See id. at ¶ 6. 
 108. See id. at ¶ 52. 
 109. See id. at ¶ 60. 
 110. See id. at ¶ 44 and compare with ¶¶ 51-60 (ESI had submitted its 
ANDA to the FDA on December 29, 1995). 
 111. See id. at ¶ 53. 
 112. See id. at ¶ 55.  As with Upsher-Smith, Schering-Plough also 
“purchased” two licenses from ESI, but has yet to utilize either of them.  See 
id. at ¶¶ 55-56. 
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In March 2001, in response to the agreement between ESI 
and Schering-Plough, the FTC charged Schering-Plough and 
Upsher-Smith with engaging in unfair methods of competition 
designed to delay the entry of a generic version of K-Dur 20 
into the U.S. market.113  Recently, this charge has been 
dismissed by one of the FTC’s administrative law judges.114  The 
FTC estimated the agreements Schering-Plough had with 
Upsher-Smith and ESI “cost consumers $100 million.”115  The 
FTC is currently appealing this decision;116 however, if they 
lose, the result could open a new pathway for similar 
agreements between brand-name and generic manufacturers.117  
The FTC is concerned that this ruling implies “the agreement 
between Schering-Plough and Upsher-Smith was a reasonable 
way to settle the patent infringement suit,”118 which is contrary 
to the FTC’s philosophy.119 
2. Hoechst Marion Roussell, Inc. 
Hoechst Marion Roussell, Inc. (“HMRI”) manufactured and 
sold Cardizem CD, a heart medication.120  In September 1995, 
Andrx filed an ANDA for its generic version of Cardizem and 
then claimed that its version did not infringe on the Cardizem 
CD patents.121  HMRI then filed a timely patent infringement 
suit against Andrx, which triggered the thirty-month stay of 
FDA final approval of Andrx’s ANDA.122  In September 1997, 
prior to the expiration of the thirty-month stay, an agreement 

 113. See id. at ¶¶ 63-67. 
 114. See FTC to Appeal Schering, Upsher-Smith Dismissal, 34 
WASHINGTON DRUG LETTER, no. 27, July 8, 2002, at 2 (“Administrative Law 
Judge Michael Chappell citied [sic] a lack of evidence in the case and 
dismissed the charges involving Schering and Upsher-Smith, as well as 
similar charges against Schering related to an arrangement between the 
company and ESI Lederle.”). 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. The FTC believes that as a result of the agreement between the 
companies, consumers were denied the benefit of competition between brand-
name and generic manufacturers, leaving less choice in the marketplace and 
having to pay higher prices for pharmaceuticals.  See Schering-Plough 
Complaint, at ¶ 67. 
 120. See Complaint at ¶ 1, In re Hoechst Marion Roussell, Inc., FTC Docket 
No. 9293 (Mar. 16, 2000), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/hoechstandrxcomplaint.htm. 
 121. See id. at ¶ 17. 
 122. See id. at ¶ 18. 
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was reached between Andrx and HMRI.123  In this agreement, 
Andrx agreed to delay the marketing of its generic version of 
Cardizem CD and HMRI agreed to make large monetary 
payments to Andrx.124  Soon thereafter, federal, state, and 
private plaintiffs brought class action and individual lawsuits 
for violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.125  The suits were 
eventually consolidated and the trial judge granted summary 
judgment, stating that the agreement was unlawful on its face 
and was a per se violation of the Sherman Act.126  The FTC also 
conducted a separate investigation that eventually resulted in 
a consent decree limiting future agreements between the two 
companies.127 
3. Abbott – Geneva 
Abbott is a major pharmaceutical company whose patented 
drug, Hytrin, accounted for over twenty percent of its $7.7 
billion in United States revenues in 1998.128  Geneva is a 
leading manufacturer of generic pharmaceuticals in the United 
States.129  Geneva was the first manufacturer to file an ANDA 
for a generic version of Hytrin, and, in April 1996, Geneva filed 
a Paragraph IV Certification with the FDA.130  Abbott sued 
Geneva for patent infringement, which triggered the thirty-
month stay of FDA approval of Geneva’s generic version of 
Hytrin.131  Abbott and Geneva then entered into an agreement 

 123. See id at ¶ 23. 
 124. See id at ¶¶ 23-26.  These payments amounted to over $10 million per 
quarter.  See id. 
 125. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp.2d 682, 684-85 
(E.D. Mich. 2000). 
 126. See id. at 685, 689 (“[T]he HMRI/Andrx Agreement is an agreement 
between horizontal competitors that allocates the entire United States market 
for Cardizem CD and its bioequivalents to Defendant HMRI, and thus 
constitutes a restraint of trade that has long been held illegal per se.. . .”). 
 127. Consent Agreement Resolves Complaint Against Pharmaceutical 
Companies Hoescht Marion Roussell, Inc. and Andrx Corp., Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, Apr. 2, 2001, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/04/hoechst.htm (“Under 
terms of the agreement, the companies [are] barred from entering into 
arrangements in the future that have the purpose or effect of delaying the 
entry of generic pharmaceuticals.”). 
 128. Complaint at ¶ 1, In re Abbott Labs., FTC Docket No. C-3946 (May 22, 
2000), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/c3946omplaint.htm. 
 129. See id. at ¶ 3. 
 130. See id. at ¶ 17. 
 131. See id. at ¶¶ 18-19.  Geneva had filed certifications for both a tablet 
and capsule form of its generic Hytrin.  Through an oversight, Abbott 
neglected to file a patent infringement suit over the capsule form.  As a result, 
 2003] HATCH-WAXMAN ACT 385 
 
whereby Abbott agreed to pay Geneva $4.5 million per month 
until a judgment in the patent dispute was issued.132  This 
agreement did not settle the suit; it simply delayed generic 
entry into the market.133  On the heels of a Federal Trade 
Commission investigation, the two companies terminated their 
agreement and Geneva finally brought their generic to 
market.134  The antitrust case eventually settled due to a FTC 
consent decree.135  This agreement limited similar 
arrangements between the two companies in the future and, 
while no financial penalties were levied, the FTC implied that 
similar conduct in the future might lead to them.136 
Based upon these cases and their report, the FTC has 
apparently concluded that these types of agreements to resolve 
patent disputes are highly suspect and perhaps per se illegal.  
FTC staff commented further at various ABA programs that 
the commission “has great skepticism toward such 
agreements.”137  This leads to their apparent conclusion that 
there is a violation of antitrust laws if the following two events 
occur:138 first, a patent holder (i.e. brand-name manufacturer) 
“who occupies its market position in substantial part because of 
its patent rights pays an alleged infringer” (i.e. generic 
manufacture), and second, the “alleged infringer then 
withholds its product from the market.”139 
The above mentioned litigation has led to discussion of how 
the Hatch-Waxman Act might be improved to mitigate these 
risks.  In July 2002, the FTC released its proposed changes.140 

the thirty-month stay applied only to the tablet form.  See id. 
 132. See id. at ¶¶ 26-27. 
 133. See id. at ¶ 29.  Geneva’s CEO publicly remarked that the agreement 
gave Geneva “‘the best of all worlds’ because Geneva obtained a risk-free 
‘monetary settlement on an ongoing basis until the litigation was resolved’ and 
could still market its product exclusively for 180 days after the litigation was 
over.”  Id. 
 134. See id. at ¶ 33. 
 135. See Balto, supra note 43, at 338. 
 136. See id. at 338-39. 
 137. Yee Wah Chin & Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Unilateral Technology 
Suppression: Appropriate Antitrust and Patent Law Remedies, in 41ST 
ANNUAL ADVANCED ANTITRUST SEMINAR: DISTRIBUTION & MARKETING, at 
1036 (Practising Law Institute Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook 
Series No. B0-01C7, Jan. – Feb. 2002). 
 138. See id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See GENERIC DRUG ENTRY STUDY, supra note 12, at ii. 
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II. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS 
The FTC study began in April 2001.141  Its purpose was to 
provide a “more complete picture” of how well generic 
competition was working under the provisions of the Hatch-
Waxman Act.142  The report was intended to help determine 
whether, among other things, the types of agreements the FTC 
has challenged between branded and generic drug makers are 
isolated instances or typical of industry practices.143  For 
example, the FTC wanted to know the frequency with which 
patent cases are settled as compared to litigated to a final court 
decision.144  Since last May, the FTC has tracked patent listings 
in the Orange Book, the timeliness of the listings and the 
number of challenges by generics.145  The FTC issued two 
recommendations aimed at correcting the deficiencies in the 
current statutory environment regulating pharmaceutical drug 
development.146 
A. RECOMMENDATION ONE 
The first recommendation is to permit only one automatic 
30-month stay per drug product in accordance with ANDA.147  
This recommendation is aimed at resolving infringement 
disputes over patents listed in the Orange Book subsequent to 
the filing date of the generic applicant’s ANDA.148  Currently a 
brand-name manufacturer can list additional patents for 
brand-name drugs in the Orange Book after the generic 
applicant has already filed an ANDA.149  This listing forces the 
generic manufacturer to submit a new Paragraph IV 
Certification, which would trigger an additional 30-month stay 
for the same drug (assuming the patent holder timely files 

 141. See id. at 1. 
 142. Id.  Specifically, the Study was to review “generic entry prior to 
expiration” of the corresponding brand-name patent.  Id. 
 143. See id. 
 144. See id. at ii. 
 145. See id.  After the United States Patent Office approves a brand-name 
pharmaceutical patent, it is then listed in the FDA’s Orange Book subsequent 
to FDA approval for use in humans.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(7)(A)(i) (2000).  
Once a drug is listed in the Orange Book, any potential competitors must first 
resort to the ANDA process.  See supra Part I.A.2. 
 146. See GENERIC DRUG ENTRY STUDY, supra note 12, at ii and vi. 
 147. See id. at ii. 
 148. See id. at iii. 
 149. See id. 
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suit).150  The FTC study indicated that this situation occurred 
eight times and resulted in additional delays for generic drugs, 
ranging in duration from four to forty months beyond the 
original extension period.151  In the four cases that eventually 
went to court, the later issued patents were found to be “invalid 
or not infringed by the ANDA.”152 
B. SECOND RECOMMENDATION 
The second recommendation relates to the 180-day 
exclusivity period and encourages Congress to pass legislation 
“to require brand name companies and first generic applicants 
to provide copies of certain agreements” to the FTC.153  Since 
these agreements may be anticompetitive and raise antitrust 
issues, this recommendation is aimed at providing the FTC 
with copies to allow the FTC to perform more timely reviews of 
the agreements.154  Since these agreements often involve the 
settlement of ANDA-related infringement suits, they result in a 
brand-name manufacturer paying a generic manufacturer to 
delay their market entry.155  This practice effectively parks the 
180-day exclusivity period and prevents subsequent generic 
competitors from entering the market.156  As part of its study, 
the FTC examined twenty settlement agreements for ANDA-
patent cases, and found that fourteen of them had the potential 
to delay the onset of the 180-day period.157  Finally, the FTC 
said it should be made clear that the 180-day exclusivity period 
starts running under the following circumstances: a generic 
company begins to sell a brand-name drug; any court issues a 
decision as to the propriety of a patent; or a court dismisses a 
declaratory judgment action for lack of jurisdiction.158   
III. DISCUSSION 
The FTC recommendations largely focus on the conduct of 
the brand-name manufacturers.  This approach is appropriate 
to the extent that brand-name manufacturers are to blame for 

 150. See id. 
 151. See id. 
 152. Id. at iv. 
 153. Id. at vi. 
 154. See id. at viii. 
 155. See id. 
 156. See id. 
 157. See id. at vii. 
 158. See id. at ix-x. 
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the problems in the pharmaceutical industry.  However, there 
is evidence that at least some problems result from actions of 
generic manufacturers, and others result from the structure of 
the pharmaceutical regulatory environment.159  Nonetheless, 
the FTC appears unable to extricate itself from the belief that 
competition in the pharmaceutical industry will improve if only 
generic manufacturers are given additional advantages.160  
Even if true at one time, this does not appear to be true 
anymore.  There are several reasons to question the wisdom of 
further tilting the balance in favor of generic manufacturers at 
the expense of brand-name manufacturers. 
However, when one looks at the FTC’s report, it is possible 
for it to appear as though there is not a significant problem in 
the first place.  Even in this litigation-rich environment the 
FTC could only find eight pharmaceuticals, where brand-name 
manufacturers may have received multiple 30-month stays.161  
However, even when an extra thirty months are granted, 
contrary to the popular perception, brand-name pharmaceutical 
companies are not getting an extra thirty months of patent life 
on top of twenty years of protection.  In actuality, the average 

 159. For an example of this result, one need look no further than the case 
of Barr Laboratories.  Although it is technically a generic manufacturer, the 
company has earned over 65% of its revenues from “settlements” with brand-
name companies and not from actually selling generic drugs.  See Bethany 
McLean, A Bitter Pill, FORTUNE, August 13, 2001, at 122. 
 160. This thought pattern is certainly an easy trap to fall into since there is 
much to like about generic drugs: they are cheaper and they generally do the 
same thing that the more expensive brand-name drug does.  However, it does 
ignore the fact that generic manufacturers are completely dependant on 
brand-name manufacturers to continue to innovate in order that the generic 
manufacturers will continue to have a stream of medications to copy.  This fact 
speaks to the need for balance in any statutory adjustments.  Just as generic 
manufacturers are dependant upon brand-name manufacturers for new 
products to copy, brand-name manufacturers are dependant upon innovation 
in order to survive.  If they cannot profitably produce new and useful 
pharmaceuticals, when the generic competitor enters the market, the brand-
name manufacturer will not survive. 
 161. See GENERIC DRUG ENTRY STUDY, supra, note 11, at 40.  There have 
been a total of 8,259 generic applications since the Hatch-Waxman Act was 
passed.  See Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Antitrust 
Implications of Patent Settlements: Hearing before the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 4-5 (2001) (prepared statement of Molly Boast, Director, 
Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade commission, Washington, DC).  
Considering that from this, there have only been fifty-eight related court 
decisions and eight “problem” cases identified by the FTC, it seems plausible 
that the Hatch-Waxman Act may actually be functioning relatively well.  See 
id. 
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effective patent life for pharmaceuticals is ten years.162  Even 
though 30-month stays may occasionally occur, the effective 
patent life is still far less than the nearly twenty years given to 
other industries.  For example, in the FTC report, the brand-
name drug, Paxil, was identified as having four 30-month 
stays.163  However, even with the stays, Paxil will have far less 
than twenty years of effective patent life due to the length of 
time required for that product’s development and approval.164  
All this indicates that, to the extent the study proposes to 
further harness brand-name manufacturers with statutory 
regulations, it may have been much ado about nothing. 
Furthermore, the study fails to consider that generic 
manufacturers already enjoy a significant advantage from the 
Hatch-Waxman Act that competitors in other industries do not 
posess.  For example, in no other industry is a competitor able 
to use its competition’s product to develop its own product and 
rely on the innovator’s safety data.  These recommendations 
simply add to the arsenal of generic manufacturers.  This fact 
can be demonstrated by the problem of frivolous ANDA filings 
by generic manufacturers claiming that a brand-name drug 
patent is invalid.  This practice has increased recently, and 
generics are challenging patents earlier and earlier.165  As the 
Hatch-Waxman Act stands now, brand-name drug 
manufacturers are given all the challenges they need to fend off 
frivolous filings.  However, if the FTC’s first recommendation 
became law, the brand-name manufacturer would be limited to 
just one 30-month challenge. 
The FTC’s second recommendation would appear to be 
appropriate to the extent that the FTC will use this 

 162. See Miller, supra note 39, at 98. 
 163. See GENERIC DRUG ENTRY STUDY supra, note 12, at 51. 
 164. Paxil received FDA approval in December 1992.  See id.  However, it 
lost patent protection in August 2001.  See Jeremy Shure, Select Recent Court 
Decisions, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 136 (2002).  As a result, Paxil only received 
approximately eight and a half years of effective patent life even after 
receiving four supposed 30-month extensions. 
 165. See Jayne O’Donnell, Makers of Generic Drugs Take Some Legal Heat, 
Too, USA TODAY, June 5, 2002, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/health/2002-06-06-generics-legal.htm (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2003).  Essentially, when a generic manufacturer files an 
ANDA with a Paragraph IV Certification, regardless of whether there is any 
merit to the generic manufacturer’s claim, the brand-name manufacturer must 
initiate a lawsuit or the FDA will approve the generic competitor regardless of 
the claim’s merit after forty-five days have expired.  See 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2000). 
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information on generic and brand-name agreements to stop 
anticompetitive actions similar to the ones described above.166  
However, this recommendation does nothing to prevent the 
filing of frivolous ANDA and Paragraph IV Certifications by a 
generic manufacturer.  The generic manufacturer has a strong 
incentive to do so via the 180-day exclusivity period.  This 
marketing exclusivity period is a considerable reward for the 
generic manufacturer, and there is virtually no consequence for 
a frivolous filing.  Since the generic product is not on the 
market, there will be no infringement damages for the brand-
name manufacturer to recover.  What might be more effective 
to prevent this practice is to have the FDA review the ANDA 
filing to ensure the generic manufacturer has not filed a 
frivolous claim.  Doing so would still allow generic 
manufacturers to have their 180-day period of market 
exclusivity, while providing some protection to the brand-name 
manufacturer against frivolous patent challenges during the 
ANDA process. 
The original objective of the Hatch-Waxman Act was “to 
balance the interests” of generic manufactures with that of 
brand-name manufacturers.167  However, according to a recent 
study by the Congressional Budget Office, this balance has not 
been achieved, tilting instead in favor of generic 
manufacturers.168  This balance would become even more tilted 
if the FTC’s recommendations are accepted.  This result is 
perhaps due to the FTC’s belief that generic drugs offer 
significant cost savings over brand-name products.  However, 
this assertion may be suspect.  Generics are certainly cheaper 
than brand-name drugs, but that statistic fails to take into 
account the total cost of care as well as the impact on patient 
health.  Studies have indicated that generic drugs may actually 
raise the cost of total health care.169  This is because, despite 
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 166. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 167. CBO DRUG STUDY, supra note 64, at 3. 
 168. See id. at ix (stating that “the cost to producers of brand name drugs 
from faster generic entry has roughly offset the benefit they receive from 
extended patent terms” and “the greater competition from  generic drugs has 
somewhat eroded [the brand-name producers’] expected returns from research 
and development”). 
 169. See Frank R. Lichtenberg, Are the Benefits of Newer Drugs Worth 
Their Cost? Evidence from the 1996 MEPS, HEALTH AFF., Sept./Oct. 2001, at 
241 (2001); Frank R. Lichtenberg, Do (More and Better) Drugs Keep People Out 
of Hospitals?, 86 AM. ECON. REV., 384 (1996).  These studies show that 
patients who were restricted to older, generic asthma and anti-depressant 
drugs wound up being sicker and spending more on hospitals, doctors, and 
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the cost savings in the short-term, there is a great incentive to 
continue using these cheap generic medications rather than the 
new pharmaceuticals that are developed.  This projected 
increase in cost is certainly not a reason to stop producing and 
encouraging generic medications; however, it does indicate a 
need for a balance that encourages a competitive marketplace 
for both generic and brand-name manufacturers.  Generics are 
never new drugs or better treatments.  They are cheaper for 
consumers, but their continued viability is entirely dependant 
on new drug innovation.  Furthermore, if one must choose 
between favoring brand-name or generic manufacturers, brand-
name manufacturers should be preferred.  The profits a generic 
manufacturer realizes are unlikely to be used for research and 
development of new pharmaceuticals.  Conversely, the very 
existence of brand-name manufacturers is dependent entirely 
on the development of a steady stream of new and innovative 
products for the market.  As such, the marketplace is likely to 
demand that profits be invested back into the research and 
development pipeline.  The resulting innovation is what 
reduces total healthcare costs and improves a consumer’s 
quality of life. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Hatch-Waxman Act’s primary purpose was to decrease 
the high cost of prescription drugs by increasing the 
availability of cheaper generic versions while still encouraging 
new drug development.  In the beginning, the Hatch-Waxman 
Act achieved this objective, as the market realized an 
unprecedented increase in generic drug entry.  However, this 
objective is becoming more difficult to achieve as some brand-
name and generic manufacturers have found ways to thwart 
the Hatch-Waxman Act’s intentions through collusive 
agreements.  As the cost of drug research and development 
rises, the pharmaceutical industry will feel increasing pressure 
to capitalize as much as possible on drug patents.  This 
pressure can lead to anticompetitive agreements that may 
violate antitrust laws. 
However, many brand-name pharmaceutical 
manufacturers feel threatened by potential infringement 
through generic competitors’ frivolous ANDA filings.  As a 
result, there is incentive to engage in potentially collusive 
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behavior to maintain their patent rights or, alternatively, to file 
frivolous extension patents.  When brand-name companies offer 
settlements to generic companies they are often too lucrative to 
ignore because they are usually more than the generic company 
could make during its 180-day exclusivity period.  The end 
result of these agreements is that consumers pay higher prices 
for brand-name pharmaceuticals and generic entry is prevented 
or stalled. 
To the extent that recent proposals by the FTC prevent 
this result, they will benefit consumers.  However, the 
proposals appear to focus mainly on the perceived 
transgressions of brand-name manufacturers.  The proposals 
do not offer any solution for the significant problem of generic 
companies filing frivolous ANDA claims against brand-name 
manufacturer patents.  These frivolous claims often result in 
settlements because brand-name manufacturers feel that 
paying off the generic company is less expensive than fighting a 
frivolous patent suit.  The FTC needs to remember that the 
overall goal is to improve competition and the welfare of the 
consumer and not simply to handicap brand-name 
manufacturers while favoring generic manufacturers. 
